• About
  • Contact
  • The blogger

A STABLE MATCH

A STABLE MATCH

Tag Archives: Misrepresentation

George Santos and the ambiguous effects of resume padding: the costs and benefits of lying and misrepresentation in the job market

Featured

Posted by tjungbau in Education, Signaling

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

George Santos, Lying, Misrepresentation, Resume padding, Self-Reported Signaling

Elected congressman George Santos has recently been subject of public scrutiny after it became known that he has repeatedly lied about his life achievements and personal background. His case, however, is hardly a one off. Resume padding, the misrepresentation of one’s personal history to increase job market attractiveness, is a common place phenomenon. While the detection of resume padding almost always leads to a breakdown of relationships due to an irrevocable loss of trust, the social effect of resume padding is more complex as explained in our paper “Self-Reported Signaling” (w Michael Waldman).

New York Congressman elect George Santos, preparing to take his seat in January, is facing strong headwinds amid calls to resign before even taking office. These demands came after it was revealed by the New York Times on December 19 that Mr. Santos has repeatedly and blatantly lied about his education and work credentials, charitable undertakings  and even his personal background. Journalists were neither able to verify his self-proclaimed working experience on Wall Street for Citigroup and Goldman Sachs, nor is there any record of him ever attending Baruch College as claimed on his biography. There is also hardly any evidence for his involvement in a dog rescue charity organization, Friends of Pets United, an activity he heavily leveraged on the campaign trail. Even claims in his online biography (now taken down) that his grandparents fled Jewish persecution in Europe have since been called in question.

After initially accusing the New York Times through his lawyer of an unsubstantiated vendetta against his persona, Mr. Santos has since apologized for “embellishing his resume,” and “a poor choice of words” in multiple interviews (New York Post, City and State New York) without taking responsibility for misrepresenting his life accomplishments and even his heritage. It is without question that Mr. Santos’ actions show a grave lack of respect for his constituents as well as at least an indifference towards others, such as people personally affected by the Holocaust.

The willingness to lie so blatantly for his own benefit without any regard for consequences is rightfully interpreted by many as a major character flaw for a public servant. Many raise questions how voters and Mr. Santos’ peers alike would ever be able to take his word for granted, and others ask whether his actions may even warrant criminal prosecution (NBC).

While I personally support these viewpoints and believe that Mr. Santos’ actions do indeed necessitate a legal sequel, particularly as it can be argued that his lying directly affected donations towards his candidacy, Mr. Santos’ story is blatant but hardly unique. In fact, he is only one among many who helped themselves to a position of power through misrepresentation of background and achievements. Resume padding is a common phenomenon employed as tactics by Chief Financial Officers, College Football Coaches, and even Prime Ministers. The detection of such a lie frequently triggers resignation or termination and even lawsuits. These are understandable consequences of the loss of trust in a person having catapulted herself into a position of power and decision making, and often, wealth.

Social consequences of resume padding, however, are much more involved, and potentially ambiguous. If lying about achievements and background is a common phenomenon, decision makers such as employers or even voters in turn will put less emphasis on these credentials when making hiring or promotion decisions. In turn, it becomes less attractive for a job-seeker or political candidate to engage in amassing these costly credentials, especially for those who face a harder prospect of doing so in the first place.

The standard theory of signaling teaches us that whenever engagement in costly activities such as education allows for inferences about personal ability, those who are vying for opportunities will overinvest in these activities/credentials. In other words, job seekers and political candidates will over-educate, build an overly packed working resume or engage in too many extra-curricular or charitable activities. By the logic above, the presence of resume padding, i.e., lying about these credentials, then lowers this overinvestment.

My co-author Michael Waldman and I detail this argument in our paper “Self-Reported Signaling,” forthcoming in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. Note that our theory relies on the (realistic) assumption that fact-checking a resume is costly, as otherwise the truth would be readily available to everyone. (Mr. Santos story strongly supports this assumption as it took investigative journalism by the New York Times to uncover inconsistencies in his story.) It follows that the overall effect of resume padding depends on the trade-off between the cost of mismatch, auditing and the breakdown of relationships with the benefit of a reduction in the over-investment in costly activities. While blunt misrepresentation such as in Mr. Santos’ case likely leads to welfare loss due to the irrevocable loss of trust, the social effect of more moderate but systematic resume padding is not necessarily negative.

Self-reported actions, signaling, and auditing

05 Friday Jun 2020

Posted by tjungbau in Academic Research, Signaling

≈ Leave a comment

Tags

Auditing, College applications, Game Theory, Lying, Misrepresentation, Resume padding, Self-reported actions, Used car markets

Actions that affect the value of a service are often self-reported rather than publicly observable. The diligence of a contractor, the education level of job applicant, or the true mileage of a used car are typically reported by the seller. This opens the door for lying and misrepresentation.

In “Self-Reported Actions, Signaling, and Auditing,” my co-author Mike Waldman and I present a model in which multiple receivers bid for the service of a sender, the value of which depends on a action taken by the sender. Instead of the action itself, receivers only observe a message reported by the sender indicating which action was taken. Receivers may opt for costly auditing to verify that the message matches the action.

We find that lying may increase social welfare when the action serves as a signal of a desirable trait of the sender. A positive likelihood of misrepresentation lowers the value of the action as a signal, and therefore counteracts the well-known over-investment result in the signaling literature. Therefore, factors that promote misrepresentation, such as a lower disutility of lying or a higher auditing fee, may increase social welfare.

This result stands in stark contrast to cases in which the action does not signal the sender’s type. We also find that the level of auditing is inverse U-shaped in the probability of the sender being dishonest, and that receivers may audit more often if the action does not serve as a signal, despite gaining less information when auditing. We apply our insights to education signaling, college applications, and odometer fraud in the used car market.

Find the full text paper HERE . I will present it at this year’s virtual editions of the EEA and the ESWC.

Recent Posts

  • George Santos and the ambiguous effects of resume padding: the costs and benefits of lying and misrepresentation in the job market
  • South-Korea’s new regulation on in-app purchases
  • Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control
  • The Strategic Decentralization of Recruiting
  • Branding Vertical Product Line Extensions

Recent Comments

tjungbau on The Trump effect and European…
napagi on Democracy or not?
John on The Trump effect and European…
Efficiency vs. distr… on Applying to multiple specialti…

Archives

  • December 2022
  • September 2021
  • August 2021
  • January 2021
  • December 2020
  • June 2020
  • March 2020
  • November 2019
  • November 2018
  • August 2018
  • July 2018
  • April 2018
  • December 2017
  • February 2017
  • January 2017
  • December 2016
  • November 2016
  • August 2016
  • June 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • November 2015
  • October 2015
  • September 2015

Categories

  • Academic Organizations
  • Academic Research
  • Antitrust
  • Auction
  • Austria
  • Cartel
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Democracy
  • Digital Economics
  • Economic Growth
  • Economics Laureates
  • Education
  • Electric Vehicles
  • Health
  • Inequality
  • Innovation
  • MBA
  • National Resident Matching Program
  • Oil
  • Online Advertising
  • Organization
  • Politics
  • Probability
  • Self-Driving Cars
  • Signaling
  • Social Dilemma
  • Statistics
  • Strategy
  • Terrorism
  • UBER
  • Voting

Meta

  • Register
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com

Recent Posts

  • George Santos and the ambiguous effects of resume padding: the costs and benefits of lying and misrepresentation in the job market
  • South-Korea’s new regulation on in-app purchases
  • Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control
  • The Strategic Decentralization of Recruiting
  • Branding Vertical Product Line Extensions

Recent Comments

tjungbau on The Trump effect and European…
napagi on Democracy or not?
John on The Trump effect and European…
Efficiency vs. distr… on Applying to multiple specialti…

Archives

  • December 2022
  • September 2021
  • August 2021
  • January 2021
  • December 2020
  • June 2020
  • March 2020
  • November 2019
  • November 2018
  • August 2018
  • July 2018
  • April 2018
  • December 2017
  • February 2017
  • January 2017
  • December 2016
  • November 2016
  • August 2016
  • June 2016
  • April 2016
  • March 2016
  • January 2016
  • December 2015
  • November 2015
  • October 2015
  • September 2015

Categories

  • Academic Organizations
  • Academic Research
  • Antitrust
  • Auction
  • Austria
  • Cartel
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Democracy
  • Digital Economics
  • Economic Growth
  • Economics Laureates
  • Education
  • Electric Vehicles
  • Health
  • Inequality
  • Innovation
  • MBA
  • National Resident Matching Program
  • Oil
  • Online Advertising
  • Organization
  • Politics
  • Probability
  • Self-Driving Cars
  • Signaling
  • Social Dilemma
  • Statistics
  • Strategy
  • Terrorism
  • UBER
  • Voting

Meta

  • Register
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com

Blog at WordPress.com.

Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
  • Follow Following
    • A STABLE MATCH
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • A STABLE MATCH
    • Customize
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar